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DECEIT AND THREATS IN PHISHING EMAILS
by
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The prevalence  of using  email  as a communication  tool  for  personal  and
professional  purposes  makes  it  a significant  attack  vector  for  cybercriminals.
Consensus exists that phishing, i.e. use of socially engineered messages to convince
recipients  into  performing  actions  that  benefit  the sender,  is  widespread
as a negative  phenomenon.  However,  little  is  known about  its  true  extent  from
a criminal  law perspective.  Similar  to how the treatment of phishing in a generic
manner does not adequately inform the relevant law, a case-by-case legal analysis
of seemingly  independent  offences  would  not  reveal  the true  scale  and  extent
of phishing as a social phenomenon. The current research addresses this significant
gap in the literature. To study this issue, a qualitative text analysis was performed
on (N=42) emails collected over a 30-day period from two email accounts. Secondly,
the phishing  emails  were  analysed  from  an Estonian  criminal  law  perspective.
The legal analysis shows that in the period of only one month, the accounts received
what  amounts  to 3  instances  of extortion,  29  fraud  attempts  and  10  cases
of personal data processing related misdemeanour offences.
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1. INTRODUCTION
It  is  suggested  that  more  than 281  billion  emails  were  exchanged  daily
in 2018.1 Recent  malicious  online  activity  reports  suggest  that  about  one
in every 2000 of these  emails  is  an attempt at phishing,2 i.e. a cyber-attack
which  utilises  socially  engineered  messages  to convince  recipients  into
performing  actions  that  benefit  the sender.  Phishing  does  not  generally
constitute  a separate  offence  under  substantive  criminal  law3 but  is
an umbrella  moniker  for  the collection  of offences  initiated  or committed,
among  other  channels,  via email.4 Therefore,  in addition  to facilitating
legitimate  communication  in the email  ecosystem,  the inbox  also  acts
as a honeypot and staging ground for various forms of criminal offences.
Research from different  fields provides a rich background to the study
of phishing. For example, phishing has been studied extensively by scholars
working in the fields of behavioural sciences, psychology and criminology.5
However,  disciplines  external  to law treat  phishing  and other  computer-
-related  criminal  activities  as generic  negative  phenomena  without
providing an accompanying legal assessment. Applying the nullum crimen
sine  lege principle,  findings  from  disciplines  researching  phishing
as a phenomenon thus do not enable the effective informing of the relevant
law.  The central  problem  here  is  a lack  of connection  between  phishing
attacks  and  the compendium  of formally  established  offences  the attacks
1 Radicati  Group. (2018)  Executive Summary. Available  from: https://www.radicati.com/wp/
wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Email-Market-2018-2022-Executive-Summary.pdf [Accessed 20
November 2018].
2 Symantec. (2018) Internet Security Threat Report. Available from: https://www.symantec.com/
content/dam/symantec/docs/reports/istr-23-2018-en.pdf [Accessed 20 November 2018].
3 In the European  Union,  this  notion  might  be  subject  to change  and  harmonisation
depending  on future  developments  (see  European  Commission  Proposal  for  a Directive
of the European  Parliament  and  of the Council  on combating  fraud  and  counterfeiting
of non-cash means of payment and replacing Council Framework Decision 2001/413/JHA.
(2017/0226) 13 September, Recital 9. Available from: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/
EN/TXT/?uri=COM:2017:0489:FIN [Accessed 20 November 2018]).
4 While email-based attacks are more common, phishing also appears in other forms such
as smishing or SMS-phishing and vishing or voice-phishing.
5 For  example,  in psychology  and  behavioural  sciences  see Rajivan,  P.  and  Gonzalez,  C.
(2018) Creative Persuasion: A Study on Adversarial  Behaviors and Strategies  in Phishing
Attacks.  Frontiers in Psychology,  135 (9); Williams, E. J., Beardmore, A. and Joinson, A. N.
(2017)  Individual  Differences in Susceptibility  to Online Influence:  A Theoretical  Review.
Computers in Human Behavior,  72, pp. 412–421; Vishwanath, A. et al. (2011) Why Do People
Get Phished? Testing Individual Differences in Phishing Vulnerability within an Integrated,
Information Processing Model. Decision Support Systems, 51 (3), pp. 576–586; in criminology
see Hutchings, A. and Hayes, H. (2009) Routine Activity Theory and Phishing Victimization:
Who Gets Caught in the ‘Net’?  Current Issues in Criminal Justice, 20 (3), pp. 433–451; Reyns,
B.  W.  (2015)  A Routine  Activity  Perspective  on Online  Victimisation:  Results  from
the Canadian General Social Survey. Journal of Financial Crime, 42 (4), pp. 396–411.
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constitute.  In contrast,  mere  case-by-case  legal  analysis  of handpicked
examples  of seemingly  independent  offences  would  only  succeed
in attaching existing criminal  law provisions to objective facts,  i.e. solving
a clearly delimited criminal case. This approach fails to reveal the scale and
impact  that  phishing  as a phenomenon  entails  in society.  For  the above
reasons,  the current  paper  takes  a socio-legal  approach  to explore
the phenomenon  of phishing.  Firstly,  a qualitative  text  analysis  was
performed on emails (N=42) received over the course of a month, which had
initial indications of being phishing attempts. The analysis focused on how
perpetrators craft stories and insert influencing techniques into their text for
the purposes  of manipulating  the recipients’  will  to act  or respond.
Secondly, the paper provides a legal assessment regarding the results with
an aim  to fill  the gap  currently  present  in phishing  literature  as well
as provide some insight into the real scale of online crime commission.
2. CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND
To the detriment  of the public  at large,  conventional  anti-crime efforts  are
falling  short  when  it  comes  to cybercrime,  including  the phenomenon
of phishing. In 2013, a study published by the United Nations Office on Drugs
and  Crime suggested  that  perhaps  only  1  %  of actual  cybercrime
victimisation  is  reported  to law  enforcement.6 The underreporting  was
stated  to derive  from  a lack  of awareness  about  victimisation  and
of reporting  mechanisms,  but  also  victim  shame  and  embarrassment.7
Perpetrators  increasingly  choose  to take  advantage  of their  potential
victims’  natural  inclination  towards  deception  and  threat  susceptibility
rather  than  wasting  time  and  resources  on overcoming  complex
technological  barriers.  As recent  literature  suggests,  criminal  actors  often
employ social engineering techniques to motivate recipients into giving out
personal information or performing specific acts.8
In general, influencing techniques,9 or urgency cues, in fraudulent emails
are used for two main reasons. Firstly, the senders aim to elicit  emotional
6 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2013) Draft Comprehensive Study on Cybercrime.
p. 119. Available from: https://www.unodc.org/documents/organized-crime/UNODC_CCP
CJ_EG.4_2013/CYBERCRIME_STUDY_210213.pdf [Accessed 20 November 2018].
7 Op. cit., p. xxi.
8 See also Williams, E. J., Beardmore, A. and Joinson, A. N. (2017), op. cit.
9 Williams,  E.  J.,  Hinds,  J.  and Joinson,  A.  N.  (2018)  Exploring  Susceptibility  to Phishing
in the Workplace. International Journal of Human-Computer Studies, p. 120.
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reactions  from  the recipients  by evoking  feelings  such  as fear or threat,10
which would inhibit the recipients’ ability to process the information under
review.11 Secondly,  urgency  cues  are  used  to draw  the recipients’  focus
away from other  aspects  of the text,  e.g. spelling  errors,  which  could aid
the user  in determining  the email’s  authenticity.12 Previous  analyses  have
also  shown  the prevalence  of urgency  cues13 and  visceral  appeals,  such
as money,  love  or sorrow,  in eliciting  compliance  from  the targets.14
Vishwanath and others also found that attention to urgency cues is positively
related to the potential  victim’s  likelihood of responding to the fraudulent
email.15
The approach  is  certainly  well-founded  as the rates  of users  clicking
on links  directing  them to fake  websites  or opening  attachments  infected
with  malware  contained  in phishing  emails  hovers  around  10  %
on average.16 These high success rates rank phishing emails as the top attack
vector  used  to bypass  technology-centred  security  efforts  and  attack
the human factor  instead.  Human beings  are  not  considered  particularly
adept at detecting deception17 and their abilities are further inhibited with
text-based,  less  rich  media  such  as email.18 The  issue  is  compounded
by the fact that the people being preyed upon by criminal  actors  consider
themselves to be  poorly  informed  about  phishing  and  other  malicious
activities  facilitated  by information  technology.19 Additionally,  the way
modern electronic communications enable access to potential victims plays
right  into  the hands  of the perpetrators.  Criminal  actors  employ  mass-
10 Workman,  M.  (2008)  Wisecrackers:  A Theory-grounded  Investigation  of Phishing  and
Pretext Social Engineering Threats to Information Security. Journal of the American Society for
Information Science and Technology, 59 (4), pp. 662–674.
11 Vishwanath, A. et al. (2011), op. cit.
12 Jakobsson,  M.  (2007) The Human  Factor  in Phishing.  Privacy  & Security  of Consumer
Information.
13 Atkins,  B.  and Huang,  W.  (2013)  A Study of Social  Engineering in Online Frauds.  Open
Journal of Social Sciences, 1 (3), pp. 23–32.
14 Button, M. et al.  (2014)  Online Frauds:  Learning from Victims Why They Fall  for These
Scams.  Australian  & New  Zealand  Journal  of Criminology,  47  (3),  pp. 391–408.  See  also
Langenderfer, J. and Shimp, T. A. (2001) Consumer Vulnerability to Scams, Swindles, and
Fraud: A New Theory of Visceral Influences on Persuasion.  Psychology and Marketing,  18,
pp. 763–783.
15 See Vishwanath, A. et al. (2011), op. cit., p. 582.
16 Verizon. (2017) Data Breach Investigations Report, 10th Ed.
17 Burgoon,  J.  K.  et al.  (1994)  Interpersonal  Deception:  Accuracy  in Deception  Detection.
Communication Monographs, 61, pp. 303–325.
18 Burgoon, J. K. et al. (2003) Detecting Deception Through Linguistic Analysis. In: Hsinchun
Chen et al. (eds.). Intelligence and Security Informatics, Springer.
19 European Commission. (2017) Special Eurobarometer 464a: Europeans’ Attitudes Towards Cyber
Security, p. 6.
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-targeting  not  exclusive  to a single  jurisdiction  and  are  satisfied  with
relatively  insignificant  gains  per successful  action  due  to the scale
of the operation.  Using these tactics  often ensures little  interest  from law
enforcement  as the latter  generally  have  high  thresholds  before  they
consider launching an investigation.20 When an investigation is  ultimately
launched, problems immediately arise concerning international cooperation
mechanisms for accessing evidence in foreign jurisdictions.21 Acting across
jurisdictional  borders  and  the ensuing  complexities  regarding  law
enforcement  efforts  is  part  of what  allows  perpetrators  to commit
computer-related offences with impunity.22
3. METHODS AND DATA
In order  to investigate  the prevalence  of email-based  crime  commission
in depth,  with direct  legal  relevance,  the authors carried out a socio-legal
study related to phishing. The phishing emails were received via two email
accounts form the sample of the study. The emails were gathered over a 30-
-day period from mid-August  to mid-September in 2018. To study emails
received on two accounts, a single email client was used. The second email
account  provided  email  data  to the email  client  through  forwarding.
Employing  a single  email  client,  or mail  user  agent,  is  justified
by considering  how  an individual  interacts  with  the email  ecosystem.
Although  people  use  or may  use  multiple  email  accounts  for  different
purposes,  e.g. personal,  work or school,  it  is  common to collect the influx
of messages  and  subsequently  view  them  using  a single  email  client23
or a single device24. This allows to view the client, or device, as the “end-of-
-route” collection point to which a person receives most, if not all, messages
sent  to them  via email.  Hence,  the chosen  method  of data  collection
20 Button, M. et al. (2014), op. cit., p. 400.
21 Osula,  A.-M.  (2015)  Mutual  Legal  Assistance  & Other  Mechanisms  for  Accessing
Extraterritorially  Located  Data.  Masaryk  University  Journal  of Law  and  Technology,  9  (1),
pp. 43–64.
22 Cromwell, C. R., Narvaez, D. and Gomberg, A. (2005) Moral Psychology and Information
Ethics:  The Effects  of Psychological  Distance  on the Components  of Moral  Behavior
in a Digital World. In: Lee Freeman and A. Graham Peace (eds.).  Information ethics: Privacy
and intellectual property. Hershey, PA: Idea Group, pp. 19–37.
23 Email client market shares suggest  Apple iPhone,  Gmail and Outlook to be the most popular
mobile, webmail and desktop email clients as of October 2018 (see Litmus Email Analytics.
(2018)  Email  Client  Market  Share. Available  from:  http://emailclientmarketshare.com/
[Accessed 20 November 2018]). 
24 Mobile devices are the most popular, followed by laptops, tablets and desktop computers.
Fluent. (2017) The Inbox Report 2017: Consumer Perceptions of Email, p. 4.
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represents  the activity  occurring  over  a one-month  period  in the final
collection point  for  an individual  who actively  uses  the email  ecosystem.
The inbox  has  also  been  used  as a source  of data  to supplement
the collection of emails  for  the analysis  of specific  scam types.25 However,
opting to collect emails over a certain time-period from a fixed source better
represents actual events and potential crime commission “as-is” compared
to focussing on specific types of emails the collection of which is not subject
to a predetermined time-limit or source, e.g. openly accessible archives can
be  used.26 The chosen  data  collection  method  has  a direct  impact
on the subsequent  application  of criminal  law  provisions,  as the raw
material for any offence considered in the legal analysis was obtained from
the fixed “end-of-route” collection point, i.e. legal analysis was performed
on messages  in fact  received,  not  on the entire  spectrum  of possible
variations and types available from external sources.
The total amount of emails received during the 30-day period was 297.
Of these  emails,  70  were  automatically  received  in the spam  folder
of the email client and no emails with indications of phishing were detected
in the primary  folder.  An initial  indication  of a phishing  attempt  includes
elements such as unknown sender, grammatical  errors,  subject  lines with
upper-case letters throughout as well as ambiguous, generic or overtly out
of place  topics.27 The indications  were  assessed  for  by quickly  scanning,
or “eye-balling”,  the folders.  From  the 70  emails  received  in the spam
folder,  28  were  assessed  to be  advertisements  from  known  senders  and
excluded  from  subsequent  analysis.  The remaining  42  emails  presented
clear initial indications of being a phishing attempt. Hence, the final sample
(N=42) for subsequent qualitative text analysis was formed of emails with
strong  initial  indications  of being  a phishing  attempt  that  were  collected
over a one-month period in the “end-of-route” email client folders.
The emails  collected  in the “end-of-route”  client  for  the current  research
amounted to 9.9 emails received per day with the total unsolicited email ratio
at 23 % and messages with strong initial indications of phishing at 14.1 %.
Qualitative text analysis was used for analysing the final (N=42) email
sample.  The analysis  started  with  hierarchical  coding  as suggested
25 Atkins, B. and Huang, W. (2013), op. cit., p. 27.
26 See MillerSmiles.  Phishing scam archives. [online] Available from: http://www.millersmiles.
co.uk/archives.php [Accessed 20 November 2018].
27 Jakobsson, M. (2007), op. cit., pp. 3–6.
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by Straus  and  Corbin.28 For  the coding  process,  the guiding  concept
of “influence and impact on the will to act” was derived from a combination
of influencing  techniques  described  in extant  literature29 as well  as how
certain criminal offences against property are analysed in law. For instance,
in extortion  cases  the offender  “bends”  the victim’s  will  to act,30 while
in robberies  the victim’s  will  to act  is  “broken”,  i.e. vis  absoluta is  used.
Bending  a victim’s  will  to act  means  applying  significant  pressure
on the target  to perform  a specific  action,  which  in extortion  cases  is
expressed  by the offender’s  goal  of ultimately  receiving some proprietary
gain  through  the use  of threats  or violence.  The proprietary  gain
of the offender  might  be  in the form of an object,  e.g. smartphone or cash,
or in the form of a proprietary right, i.e. a transfer of funds from the victim’s
bank account to the offender. What differentiates extortion from robberies
and  bending  the victim’s  will  to act  from  breaking  it  completely,
is the presence  or absence  of the need  for  a victim  to also  perform  some
action.  It  is  possible  to assert  that  extortion-type  interactions  require
an active  victim,  whilst  in robbery  type  interactions  the victim  would
remain largely inactive (see Figure 1).
Figure 1: The RIFE (Robbery, Informational, Fraud, Extortion) scale
of influence and impact on the will to act
28 Strauss, A. and Corbin, J. (1998)  Basics of Qualitative Research: Techniques and Procedures for
Developing Grounded Theory. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
29 Williams, E. J., Beardmore, A. and Joinson, A. N. (2017), op. cit.
30 Case no. 3-1-1-103-12.  (2012) Estonian Supreme Court (Criminal Chamber),  23 November
2012.
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However, robbery-type interactions are no longer possible in the email
ecosystem,31 i.e. a person cannot be victimised just by opening an email they
have received. In terms of the intensity of impact on the victim’s will to act,
extortion  and  robbery  type  interactions  populate  the strong  impact  side
of the intensity  axis.  The other  side  of the intensity  axis,  or the weak
intensity  of impact  methods  used  in influencing  a person’s  will  to act,  is
inhabited by fraud type and purely informational type interactions. In cases
of fraud, the victim performs an action freely but based on misconceptions
caused  by the offender,  i.e. due  to deception.  Purely  informational
interactions merely convey a message from the sender and thus would not
achieve  the effects  that  criminal  actors  desire,  e.g forwarding  sensitive
personal  information,  credit  card  information,  getting  the recipient
to transfer funds or open file attachments. As the intensity of impact can be
considered  weak  in both  fraud  and  purely  informational  types,
distinguishing  between  the two  derives  from  the presence  or absence
of cues  directing  the recipient  to take  action  in a manner  suggested
by the sender. In fraud type messages, a bogus storyline is often presented
to the recipient with the intention of getting the user to act in a specific way,
e.g. visit  a website or forward credit  card information.  Informational  type
messages  do  not  direct  the recipient  towards  taking  specific  action.  It
follows  then  that  informational  messages  are  also  void  of any  guidance
on how the recipient should go about performing an action, e.g. providing
links  to external  websites  or contact  information  in the form  of email
addresses  and  phone  numbers.  Therefore,  the first  order  coding  used
the RIFE  scale to assess  emails  received  in the client.  The initial  coding
resulted  in 3  extortion  type  phishing  emails  and  39  fraud  type  emails.
Hence,  phishing  emails  are  inherently  actionable,  i.e. the  senders  always
have the goal of getting the recipient to act in a specific manner regardless
of the intensity of impact present in the message or the methods of influence
used  in the interaction.  The RIFE  scale provides  answers  to the question
“What,  if anything,  are  the senders  trying  to get  me  to do?”.  As the second
round of coding only concerns actionable phishing emails, it was designed
to answer  the question  “How  are  the senders  trying  to get  me  to do  it?”.
In the second round of coding,  the extortion  and fraud type emails  were
31 Hoffman, G. (2016) Why You Can’t Get Infected Just by Opening an Email (Anymore). [online]
Available  from:  https://www.howtogeek.com/135546/htg-explains-why-you-cant-get-
infected-just-by-opening-an-email-and-when-you-can/ [Accessed 20 November 2018].
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assessed  based  on four  binary  categories  derived  from  the final  sample
of 42 emails (see Table 1).
A B
Relationship Establishing Assumed
Action Implicit Explicit
Influence Persuasion-type Threat-type
Dominance Recipient Controlled Sender Controlled
Table 1: The RAID (Relationship, Action, Influence, Dominance) categories
present in phishing emails
The first category considered sender-recipient relationships, i.e. whether
the email  assumed  an existing  relationship  between  the two  or tried
to establish one.  For example, a previous relationship would be assumed
if the senders masquerade as employees of a company the services of which
the recipient  uses or might  have used in the past.  In contrast,  establishing
a relationship would be premised by an apologetic opening, e.g. “You do not
know  me,  but  here  is  my  story”.  The second  category  concerned  whether
the reference to the action desired by the recipient  was explicit  or implicit,
e.g. “pay the amount to this account” versus “the funds can only be released after
your  payment”.  The third  category  concerned  the choice  in influencing
techniques, i.e. persuasion-influencing or presenting an enticing story based
on bogus facts and threat-influencing or evoking the emotions of fear and
urgency  regarding  the potential  consequences  of non-compliance.
The fourth  category  pertained  to the balance  of control,  or dominance,
in sender-recipient  interaction.  In a sender-dominant  communication,
the interaction  is  controlled  by the initiator,  e.g. in extortion  type
interactions. In contrast, a recipient-dominant communication leaves it open
for  the recipient  to choose  whether  to act  or respond,  e.g. in fraud  type
interactions. The RAID (Relationship; Action, Influence, Dominance) model was
developed for a more in-depth analysis of the choices made by the senders
in composing their phishing messages.
4. FINDINGS
4.1. PHISHING EMAILS: TEXT ANALYSIS
With  most  messages,  the sender  information  displayed  in the mandatory
email  headers (From; Date) did not match the information available from
the full  email  header.  For  example,  an email  apparently originating  from
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Shauna,  sent  from  admin@localuniversity.ee, in fact,  has  a return-path,
or the address where non-delivery receipts – also called bounce messages –
are sent, of admin@alisonparkerg.com. This instance is made problematic for
email  recipients  who  are  less  informed  about  the technological
underpinnings  of the email  ecosystem.  Judging  by the mandatory  email
headers  displayed,  the message  seems  to originate  from  Shauna and
the local  university.  However,  without  looking  at the full  email  header,
the rest  of the information  remains  hidden  to the recipient.  The malicious
practice  of sending  communication  from  an unknown  source  disguised
as a source known to the sender is called “spoofing” and email spoofing is
one of the most common versions of it. Central to the issue here is whether
an end-user possesses the know-how to scrutinise the available information
further  or obtain  additional  information.  Shauna working  for
the administration of an international  university is  certainly possible.  Due
to the name,  however,  local  users’  attention  is  likely  to become activated
based on the discrepancy between what is observed and what is expected.32
In other instances,  the claimed sender and the email  address were visibly
mismatched.  For  example,  different  senders  claimed  to be  from the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security, the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank as well as from
JPMorgan Chase Bank, but all messages were sent via mail-servers in Japan
with  reply-to  addresses  registered  in Gmail.  Within  the context
of processing  an email,  sender  information  spoofing  is  usually  the first
attempt  at social  engineering.  The above  examples  used  the perceived
authority  of the sender  to elicit  compliance  from  the recipient.33
Additionally,  senders  tried  to establish  legitimacy  by describing  their
reputable  business  (“EVANS  THOMAS  LAW  FIRM  SOLICITORS
& ADVOCATES”)  or position  (“I’m  Mohamed  Usman,  a delegate  from
the united nation office”).
In an email  message,  greetings  can  be  considered  a separate  group
of recipient  activators.  Common openings  can  range from generic  (“Hi”)
to out-of-place  ones  (“Dearly  Beloved,”)  but  also  include  overtly  shrill
examples like “GOOD DAY LUCKY ONES, DEAR EMAIL OWNER”. When
no suspicions arose regarding sender information,  then generic  greetings
32 Grazioli,  S.  (2004)  Where  Did  They  Go  Wrong?  An Analysis  of the Failure
of Knowledgeable Internet Consumers to Detect Deception over the Internet. Group Decision
and Negotiation, 13, pp. 149–172.
33 Office  of Fair  Trading.  (2009)  The Psychology  of Scams:  Provoking  and  Committing  Errors
of Judgement.
2019] K. Kikerpill, A. Siibak: Living in a Spamster’s Paradise ... 55
direct  the recipient  to continue on to the body of the message.  Conversely,
markedly  out-of-place  or overemphasised  openings  seem
counterproductive  to the sender’s  intentions  as it  draws  all  attention
to the discrepancy in the greeting, even if nothing about sender information
was particularly alarming. The major difference between less sophisticated
phishing emails  and  spear  phishing emails  seems  to be  based
on the understanding that everything up to the body of the email  is  about
maintaining  neutrality  about  the legitimacy  of the message,  not  actively
establishing  it.  This  notion  was  abided  by in the Shauna example,
as the email  had no alarming qualities  in the sender information,  skipped
the opening  entirely  and  started  with  the text  body.  Legitimate  “cold
emails”,  or emails  sent  without  prior  contact  between  the sender  and
recipient,  are  a common  occurrence  in business  environments.34 For  this
reason, it’s not always possible for people to outright disregard emails they
were  not  expecting  to receive,  unless  they  are  put  off  by a non-sensical
subject line or a shrill greeting.
An additional category of openings, which at times also simultaneously
feature  on the email’s  subject  line,  are  the senders  who explicitly  require
attention from the recipients  (“ATTENTION CARD HOLDER”;  “Attention
Dear Esteemed Beneficiary”;  ”Attention my old friend”). However, expressions
of influencing  techniques  do  not  necessarily  have  to be  explicit
in the messages  to still  be  effective.  In well-timed  spear  phishing35 emails
used  in Business  Email  Compromise  (BEC) scams –  sometimes  also  called
whale phishing  because of the high-value target – perpetrators collect more
background  information  about  the person  they  will  be  impersonating
as well as the one to be victimised prior to submitting the email. A message
with spoofed sender information, legitimacy derived from the employment
relationship  between  the perceived  sender  and  recipient,  an excuse  for
spelling mistakes in the form of “sent from a mobile device” as well as stating
that they cannot be currently reached are all a build-up to the persuasion.
Requiring the recipient to make a wire transfer the same day and given that
such  emails  are  often  sent  an hour  or less  before  the close  of business,
creates a sense of urgency from context. The choices left to the recipient are
34 Krause,  M. and Kulkarni,  A. (2015) Predicting Sales E-Mail  Responders Using a Natural
Language Model.  In:  Conference on Human Computation & Crowdsourcing 2015, San Diego,
USA. 
35 A more advanced form of phishing emails that can be highly sophisticated, targeted and
personalised. 
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to either go against  the direct  instructions of their  superior or,  using pre-
existing  knowledge about  BEC scams,  still  try and verify  the transaction
through channels other than the one used to send instructions.
Based  on the body  text  of the emails  in the sample,  two  distinct  ways
of eliciting compliance from the recipients can be brought out: persuasions
and threats. There were three instances of threatening emails that followed
an almost  identical  modus  operandi,  so  these  will  be  analysed  collectively
based on one example. The message started with priming the recipient with
a suggestion  to prepare  oneself  and  establishing  relevancy  without
a greeting  (“Take  a deep  breath  and  read  very  carefully  do  not  ignore  this  e-
-mail  !!”).  The next  line  of the email  was  a failed  attempt  at legitimising
the subsequent threat by exhibiting that the sender knows something about
the sender (“It appears that, (), is your password. Will possibly not know me and
you are probably wondering why you are getting this e-mail, right?”). The closed
brackets  in the message  are  a placeholder  for  a password  related
to the email  address  or account  that  the message  was  received  on.
In preparation for sending these emails, the perpetrators often scrape online
resources to find data dumps or published lists of accounts and respective
passwords  for  the purposes  of adding  perceived  legitimacy  to their
threats.36 After  presenting  what  was  intended  to be  a real  password  for
an account,  the email  continued  to describe  specific  ways  the sender  had
gained access to the recipient’s personal device that leads to:
“my  computer  software  obtained  all  your  contacts  from  the Messenger,
Microsoft  outlook,  FB,  in addition  to emails  it  created  a backdoor
so i accessed  and  downloaded  all  of the data  which  includes  all  videos,
photographs and records in it”.
Instructions are then provided to the recipient on how to avoid the ensuing
embarrassment by paying the sender in Bitcoin cryptocurrency:
“Important:  You  have  1  day  to make  the payment.  (I  have  a completely
unique pixel within this e mail, and at this moment I am aware that you've
read  through  this  email  message).  If  I  do  not  get  the BitCoins,  I  will
certainly  send  your  video  recording  to all  of your  contacts  including
relatives, co-workers, and so forth”.
36 Jaeger,  D.  et al.  (2016)  Analysis  of Publicly  Leaked  Credentials  and  the Long  Story
of Password  (Re-)use.  In:  11th  International  Conference  on Passwords  (PASS-WORDS2016),
Germany: Springer. 
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The email  concludes  by attempting  to evoke  a feeling  of helplessness
in the recipient by stating:
“It is a non-negotiable offer, that being said don't waste my personal time
and yours by responding to this message”.
The same  scenario  with  slight  differences  in wording  was  played  out
in three  separate  emails.  Aside  from  trying  to coerce  the target  into
following  specific  payment  instructions,  there  was  an evident  attempt
on the part  of the sender  to confuse  the recipient  by adding  as many
technical  terms  to their  activity  description  as possible.  For  example,
the sender  included  both  an abbreviation  of a term  and  its  explanation
in the message:
“During the time you were watching videos, your internet browser began
operating as a RDP (Remote  Access)  which gave  me accessibility  of your
computer screen”.
Thus, the modus operandi in these three cases was first  to assert legitimacy
by trying  to display  a real  password  and  confuse  the recipient  with
an overload  of technical  terms.  This  was  followed  by evoking  a feeling
of fear  and embarrassment  in the user  by claiming to possess  images and
videos  of a sensitive  nature.  The email  was  concluded  by presenting
a demand and threatening the recipient.
In contrast to the threatening emails, most of the messages in the sample
employed  persuasive  tactics  to get  the recipient  to follow  instructions.
The main  actions  suggested  to the user  were  to forward  their  personal
information  so  that  a large  payment  could  be  released  to them,
or alternatively  to pay  a small  amount  of money  to obtain  access
to outrageous  riches.  To establish  rapport  with  the recipient,  a common
opening was detailed regarding the sender's person and described the hard
times they had fallen on:
“I am Mrs. Iris J. Stobbs from Sao Tome and Principe, I was married to late
Mr. Patrick Stobbs the CEO of PATCAT Oil Mining & Exploration, I am
58 years old, I am suffering from a long time cancer of the breast which has
affected my talking & hearing lately”.
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By referring  to the impaired  speaking  and  hearing  abilities,  the sender  is
trying to persuade  the user  that  the received  email  was  perhaps  the only
viable  way  for  them  to establish  contact.  The story  continues  to describe
the sender  and their  late  husband  as “true  Christians” who unfortunately
were not able to have a child, which is why the sender
“sold  all  my  inherited  belongings  and  deposited  all  the  sum
of USD10,300,000.00 with a Bank”.
Claiming a religious affiliation is intended to provide a motivational basis
for  what  the sender  would  like  to see  happen  to the money  once
the recipient has received it:
“It  is  my last  wish to see  that  this  money is  invested in any Charitable
Organization of your choice and distributed each year among the Charity
organizations and Orphanages, so I want a good humanitarian to use this
money to fund Churches,  Needy and Widows in São  Tomé and Principe
or in your Country but preferably in São Tomé and Principe”.
The message concludes with the sender reasserting previous claims about
her  failing  health  and  expects  a reply  to an email  address  that  does  not
match  the  sender’s.  The reply  would  be  considered  an indication  that
the recipient is willing to carry out the sender’s final wish. In a final attempt
to describe her conditions, the sender adds:
“As soon as I receive your reply I shall use the little money I have for my
drugs and Medi-care to procure and issue you a letter of authority which
will prove that you are the new beneficiary of my funds and I shall release
the contact of the Bank to you”.
Thus,  if the recipient  is  willing,  they  would  ultimately  receive
an outrageous  sum  of money  while  the sender  languishes  with  next
to nothing.  Should  the recipient  then  engage  in communication  with
the sender, it’s likely that somewhere along the way the poor sender would
need  some  financial  assistance  in releasing  the funds.  Other  variants
of the final request included a specific list of personal information required
from  the recipient  upfront,  or the request  for  a small  sum  of money  was
indeed already included in the initial email.
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4.2. PHISHING EMAILS: LEGAL ANALYSIS
Considering  the results  presented  in the previous  section,  the following
offences  will  be  discussed  in the legal  analysis:  attempt  to commit  fraud
(§ 209 I,  § 25 II),  extortion (§ 214) as criminal  offences under the Estonian
Penal  Code37 (hereinafter  PC),  as well  as the violation  of personal  data
processing requirements,  which constitutes  a misdemeanour  under § 42 I
of the Personal Data Protection Act38 (hereinafter  PDPA).  As provided for
in § 209 I of the PC, the corpus delicti of general fraud is
“the causing of proprietary damage to another person by knowingly causing
a misconception of the existing facts”
and the perpetrator  must  act  with  the aim  of gaining  proprietary  benefit
himself  or herself.  Causing  a misconception  or deceiving  the potential
victim is a necessary element for an offence to be considered under § 209 I.
Fraud is  a consequence-offence,  i.e. the commission of fraud has not fully
concluded  unless  proprietary  damage  has  occurred  to the victim.
In the sample emails, the senders claimed that
“You have $5000 waiting for you at MONEY GRAM now to pick it”
and followed it by:
“but  before  you  can  pick  up  the $5000  you  have  to pay  sum of $27  for
ACTIVATION”.
The misconception  of the existing  facts,  in this  case,  would
be the fraudulent  claim  that  a fairly  large  sum  of money  is  waiting
for the recipient  in a payment  system.  Yet,  to gain  access  to this  money,
the recipients  would  have  to pay  something  first  themselves –  a sum
of USD27 that is small relative to the promised gain. The likelihood of ever
receiving  the promised  sum  after  payment  is  non-existent.  Therefore,
the senders are acting with the aim of gaining proprietary benefit and have
also  engaged in deceiving  or trying  to deceive  the recipient.  Fraud under
§ 209 I must be an intentional act according to § 15 I of the PC, it cannot be
37 Penal  Code (Karistusseadustik)  2001.  SI  2001/61,  364.  Estonia:  Riigi  Teataja  (State  Gazette).
In Estonian. English translation available from: https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/509072018
004/consolide [Accessed 19 November 2018].
38 Personal Data Protection Act (Isikuandmete kaitse seadus) 2007. SI 2007/24, 127. Estonia: Riigi
Teataja (State  Gazette).  In Estonian.  English  translation available  from: https://www.riigi
teataja.ee/en/eli/507032016001/consolide [Accessed 19 November 2018].
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committed  with  negligence.  In the current  case,  it  would  be  difficult
to claim that the senders submitted the email by being negligent in wording
their message or choosing the recipient.  Since the recipient  never engaged
the senders and, more importantly, did not pay the small activation sum, no
proprietary  damage  has  occurred.  In other  words,  the necessary
consequence  has  not  occurred,  and  the senders  of the email  have  not
committed fraud. However, § 25 I of the PC also establishes the definition
of an  attempt,  which  is  an intentional  act  the purpose  for  which  is
to commit  an offence.  We  established  the intent  in the email  but  were
unable to consider the commission of fraud as completed. § 25 II of the PC
states that an attempt is deemed to have commenced at the moment when
the person,  according  to the person’s  understanding  of the act,  directly
commences the commission of an offence.  In the example,  the senders had
submitted the email as-is but had gained no benefit, because the recipient
did not fall for the deception. It is characteristic of an attempt to involve all
the subjective  injustice  of an offence  but  have  certain  shortcomings
in the objective elements,39 which in the chosen example was both the lack
of proprietary  benefit  gained  by the senders  and  proprietary  damage
inflicted  on the recipient.  Based  on the facts,  the senders  might  be
accountable  for  an attempt  to commit  fraud  according  to § 209 I,  § 25 II
of the PC.
However, the majority of persuasive emails did not prompt the recipient
to pay  a certain  sum  but  instead  crafted  a fraudulent  story  to obtain
personal  information.  In the following  example,  the preceding  story  was
similar to the one described previously:
“We  have  deposited  the check  of your  fund  ($4.500,000  Million  USD)
through MONEY”,
which was followed by asking the recipient to forward their name, country,
phone number and address to the senders. Alternatively, the recipient could
also call the number provided in the email. Since the basis for the collection
of personal  data  from  the recipients  in the example  is  fraudulent,
the senders might be accountable for the misdemeanour offence of violating
other  requirements  for  the processing  of personal  data  under  § 42 I
of the PDPA.  The other  requirements  that  are  violated  in the cases
39 Sootak, J. (2010) Karistusõigus. Üldosa. Tallinn: Juura, p. 474.
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of fraudulent  emails  come  mainly  from  the first  and  second  sentences
of § 12 I  of the PDPA. Namely, the subject  whose personal data would be
processed  must  provide,  of their  free  will,  consent  for  any  processing
activities.  Furthermore,  the processor  of personal  data  must  also  clearly
state  the purpose  for  which  the subject’s  personal  data  is  collected.
In the example  email,  the purpose  for  collecting  personal  data  from
the recipient  is  connected  to the release  of outrageous  sums  of money.
The likelihood  of that  basis  being  legitimate  is  of course  non-existent.
If the recipient  decides  to release  their  information  to the senders  based
on the bogus  premise,  the senders  would  be  accountable  for
the misdemeanour  offence.  When  recipients  are  asked  for  personal
information  and  the perpetrators,  in fact,  manage  to obtain  it,  the most
common  subsequent  course  of action  on the part  of the perpetrators  has
been to illegally use the identity of the unsuspecting victim to order goods
or sign up for services in their name.
Three  phishing  emails  in the sample  constituted  the commission
of extortion  according  to § 214 I  of the PC.  Extortion  is  defined
as the coercion of another person to transfer proprietary benefits by the use
of threat  to restrict  the liberty  of the person,  disclose  embarrassing
information  or destroy  or damage  property,  or by use  of violence.
The sender  threatened  to disclose  embarrassing  videos  and  pictures
of the recipient,  unless  the recipient  paid  USD1,200  in Bitcoin
cryptocurrency  within  one  day  of having  received  the email.  Extortion
as a criminal offence has a truncated body of constituent elements, meaning
that the criminal act need not, in fact, be entirely completed to hold a person
accountable  for  its  commission.40 Put  differently,  the necessary  elements
of extortion  were  fulfilled  once  the sender  levied  the threat  accompanied
by a demand  for  proprietary  value.  Whether  the sender  ever  receives
the Bitcoins or any other proprietary benefit in relation to the specific case, is
irrelevant for prosecution. Similarly, whether the sender of the email really
possessed  any  embarrassing  videos  or images  of the recipient  bears  no
relevance.
Considering that the emails in the sample were collected over a period
of just  30  days  on two  personal  email  accounts,  the total  of 3  cases
of extortion, 29 attempts to commit fraud as well as ten attempts to obtain
40 Sootak, J. (2010), op. cit., p. 235.
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personal information from the recipient is extensive. By comparison, there
were  only  74  registered  cases  of extortion  nation-wide  according
to the Estonian  crime  statistics  for  2017.41 The way  modern  electronic
communications  have  enabled  the convergence  of perpetrators  and
potential  victims  has  created  a startling  ballooning  of the number
of offences committed in the course of daily life. The ease with which crimes
can be committed by sending a specifically crafted email raises the age-old
issue  regarding  the trustworthiness  of registered  crime  statistics
as the reflection  of social  reality.  From an international  perspective,  when
cybercrimes  were  first  included  into  the crime  statistics  published
by the Office  for  National  Statistics for  England  and  Wales  in 2016,
the numbers  nearly  doubled  compared  to the previous  year.42
The experimental  statistics  on fraud  and  computer  misuse  offences  have
mostly  retained  their  rates  since,  with  some  decrease  in the commission
of computer  misuse  offences.43 Derived  from  the results  of the current
analysis,  a similar  spike  in crime  reporting  would  take  place  in Estonia.
In terms  of their  modus  operandi,  criminal  offences  are  no  longer
in the process of moving from the physical  to the digital  but have already
found a very comfortable home. Yet, these offences are still poorly reported
by people  and  thus  also  in national  statistics,  which  ultimately  results
in the obfuscation  and  to an extent  even  the downplaying  of the ongoing
situation.  Anti-crime  efforts  in this  specific  area  must  turn  the focus
to providing  people  with  the necessary  know-how  of detecting  and
reporting instances of email-based commission of offences. Traditional law
enforcement efforts are severely hindered when it comes to cybercrime due
to the speed  with  which  these  offences  are  committed,  i.e. it  only  takes
an email and its submission to fulfil the necessary elements of the offences
analysed in the sample. With no reasonable way of interjecting traditional
protective measures between the offender and victim, the latter need better
tools  and  knowledge  to protect  themselves –  these  can  be  facilitated
41 Ministry  of Justice.  (2017)  Kuritegevus  Eestis  2017, p. 146.  In Estonian.  Available  from:
http://www.kriminaalpoliitika.ee/sites/krimipoliitika/files/elfinder/dokumendid/kuritegevu
seestis_2017_veebi01.pdf [Accessed 5 November 2018].
42 Office for National Statistics.  (2017)  Crime in England and Wales:  Year Ending in Dec 2016.
Available from: https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/crimeandjustice/
bulletins/crimeinenglandandwales/yearendingdec2016 [Accessed 5 November 2018]. 
43 Office for National Statistics. (2018) Crime in England and Wales: Year Ending in March 2018.
Available from: https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/crimeandjustice/
bulletins/crimeinenglandandwales/yearendingmarch2018 [Accessed 5 November 2018].
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in the form of systematic public campaigns and educational undertakings,
e.g. massive open online courses (MOOCs).
5. CONCLUSION
This  article  discussed  the current  prevalence  of email-based  commission
of crimes  and  how  these  offences  remain  largely  hidden,  both  from
the victims and thus also from national statistics. To illustrate the situation,
qualitative text analysis was performed on emails (N=42) received from two
email  accounts  as collected  in a single  “end-of-route”  email  client.
The results of the criminal law analysis showed that over the course of only
one  month  there  were  3  cases  of extortion,  29  attempts  of fraud  and
10 personal  data  processing  related  misdemeanour  offences  committed.
Contrary to officially available national statistics, the analysis in the current
article  clearly showed that the real  situation in cybercrime commission is
much more severe and in need of immediate  attention by criminal  policy
decision-makers.  Traditional  law  enforcement  efforts  have  largely  failed
due  to the speed  of crime  commission  in online  environments.
The difference between having to bear the negative consequences of email-
-based extortion, fraud and issues concerning personal data and securely
using  important  modern  communications  environments  lies  with
the potential victims themselves. By analysing the rates of offending as well
as providing  an in-depth  analysis  of how  criminals  craft  their  messages,
the article  has  practical  implications  for  decision-makers  in their  future
crime  prevention  efforts.  Specifically,  as such  efforts  approach
the dissemination  of relevant  knowledge  necessary  for  preventing
victimisation via email.
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